Own-Initiative Investigation and Horizontal Accountability in Indonesian Public Service Oversight

Abstract

This study analyses own-initiative investigation, a statutory power enabling proactive public-service oversight, from a state administrative law perspective and as a mechanism of horizontal accountability. A descriptive qualitative study with a juridical-empirical approach was conducted at the Ombudsman Representative Office of Bengkulu Province, Indonesia. Data came from in-depth interviews with six key informants, observation, and documentary review of statutes, ombudsman regulations, and institutional reports. Analysis followed Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña and was structured by six accountability criteria derived from Bovens. Formal legality is satisfied, but effectiveness is constrained by four conditions: operational independence depends on coordination with investigated institutions; transparency is concentrated on publication of final reports; evidentiary credibility depends heavily on investigator competence; and consequences are weak because recommendations lack binding sanctions. The study covers one representative office and a small number of executed investigations. It identifies a regulatory gap that weakens proactive public-service oversight. It combines horizontal-accountability analysis with state administrative law to assess own-initiative investigation.